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From superstar firms to super-individuals: theoretical foundations of the one-person company

Fundamentos teóricos de la empresa unipersonal con inteligencia artificial

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ABSTRACT

The one-person company, a firm in which artificial intelligence substitutes for the employees, managers and contractors that a conventional venture would hire, is presented in policy and practitioner commentary as the successor to the superstar firm, but its theoretical foundations have not been assembled. This narrative review synthesizes the economics of superstar firms, the transaction-cost and knowledge-based theories of the firm, and the task-based automation literature to state the conditions under which the transition from the superstar firm to the super-individual is coherent and the conditions under which it fails. The synthesis shows that the superstar-firm literature explains why production concentrated, that the theory-of-the-firm literature explains which costs artificial intelligence lowers, and that the task-based literature explains why the founder, rather than the firm, becomes the unit of production. The one-person company hypothesis is coherent as an extension of these three bodies of work, but it is not yet supported by any verified case of a one-person unicorn, and its boundary conditions are founder skill, platform dependence and the irreplaceable residue of human judgment. The review concludes that the super-individual is a plausible limiting case of a real technological trend rather than an established fact, and that future work should test it against survival, scale and liability outcomes.

Keywords: one-person company; solopreneur; super-individual; superstar firms; artificial intelligence; theory of the firm

RESUMEN

La empresa unipersonal, una firma en la que la inteligencia artificial sustituye a los empleados, gestores y contratistas que una empresa convencional contrataría, se presenta en la política y en la literatura profesional como la sucesora de la empresa superestrella, pero sus fundamentos teóricos no se han reunido. Esta revisión narrativa sintetiza la economía de las empresas superestrella, las teorías de la empresa basadas en los costes de transacción y el conocimiento, y la literatura de automatización basada en tareas, para enunciar las condiciones en las que la transición de la empresa superestrella al superindividuo es coherente y las condiciones en las que fracasa. La síntesis muestra que la literatura de empresas superestrella explica por qué se concentró la producción, que la teoría de la empresa explica qué costes reduce la inteligencia artificial y que la literatura basada en tareas explica por qué el fundador, y no la firma, se convierte en la unidad de producción. La hipótesis de la empresa unipersonal es coherente como extensión de esos tres cuerpos de trabajo, pero todavía no está respaldada por ningún caso verificado de unicornio unipersonal, y sus condiciones límite son la habilidad del fundador, la dependencia de plataformas y el residuo irreemplazable del juicio humano. La revisión concluye que el superindividuo es un caso límite plausible de una tendencia tecnológica real y no un hecho establecido, y que el trabajo futuro debe contrastarlo frente a resultados de supervivencia, escala y responsabilidad.

Palabras clave: empresa unipersonal; superindividuo; empresas superestrella; inteligencia artificial; teoría de la empresa

INTRODUCTION

The one-person company is the hypothesis that a single founder, augmented by artificial intelligence, can build and operate a firm that would once have required a workforce of employees, managers and contractors. The hypothesis carries three names that denote the same claim, the one-person unicorn in practitioner commentary, the super-individual in the economics of the future of work, and the AI-enabled one-person company in the scholarly literature, and the three names converge on a single proposition, that the tool replaces the staff rather than the founder.[1,2]

The proposition is not marginal, because it inverts the dominant empirical trend of the past four decades, in which a small number of superstar firms absorbed an increasing share of sales, employment and profit while the aggregate labour share fell. The reallocation was documented across the United States, Belgium and international trade.(3-5)

Artificial intelligence is a candidate driver of that same concentration, because firms that adopt it grow faster, and because its labour-substituting effect raises the concentration of vendors and customers around the firms that use it.[6,7] The tension between the two predictions, that a technology concentrates production in a few large firms and disperses it to a single founder, is the unresolved question that the one-person company poses.

The term used throughout this chapter is the one-person company, the alternative names are retained as keywords, and the definition is operational rather than rhetorical, a firm whose founding, operation and growth are carried by one founder and a set of artificial-intelligence tools.

The theoretical literature that bears on that question is fragmented across three disciplines that rarely cite one another, and the fragmentation is the gap this review addresses. The economics of superstar firms explains why production concentrated, but it treats the firm as the unit of analysis and does not ask whether the unit could shrink to one person.[3,8] The theory of the firm explains why firms exist and where their boundaries are drawn, but its classic statements, from the nature of the firm to the knowledge-based view, predate the generative wave, and its recent extensions to artificial intelligence are conceptual rather than tested.(9-11)

The task-based automation literature explains which tasks a machine displaces and which it reinstates, but it stops at the worker and does not follow the task to the boundary of the firm.[12,13] A founder or a policymaker who asks whether the one-person company is a real limit of these three bodies of work, or a speculation dressed as theory, receives no single answer, because no existing review has placed the three literatures in one frame. The objective of this review is to synthesize the theoretical foundations of the artificial-intelligence-enabled one-person company and to delimit the conditions under which the transition from the superstar firm to the super-individual is plausible.

The question the chapter asks is narrower than the aim, and it is this, whether the same mechanisms that explain the rise of the superstar firm also explain, at their limit, the disappearance of the firm into a single founder, and the answer requires the three literatures to be read as one rather than as three.

DEVELOPMENT

The review assembled forty-six works distributed across four axes, and the distribution is the first result of the review. Twelve works addressed the concentration of superstar firms, ten addressed the theories of the firm and its boundaries, ten addressed task-based automation, and fourteen addressed the one-person company hypothesis and its adjacent evidence, and the four axes are not independent, because the hypothesis is precisely the claim that the second and third axes, the lowering of firm costs and the automation of tasks, reverse the first, the concentration of production (Table 1).

The development that follows states that claim axis by axis, beginning with the concentration it would reverse and ending with the boundary conditions that gate it. The literature is recent, with the largest share published between 2024 and 2026, and that recency is itself a finding, because the theoretical foundations of the one-person company are being laid in real time rather than drawn from an established canon.

The superstar-firm axis establishes the starting condition that the hypothesis would reverse. The fall of the labour share since the 1980s was associated with a reallocation of sales toward a small number of highly productive firms, and the mechanism was not scale alone but the capacity of those firms to serve a market with fewer workers than their competitors.(3) Automation was one

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driver of that capacity, because it allowed a leading firm to raise its productivity without raising its employment, and the rise of superstar firms was therefore partly an automation phenomenon rather than a demand phenomenon.(14)

Table 1. Synthesis of the four theoretical axes and their key claims.

Axis	Key claim	Representative studies
Superstar firms and concentration	Production and the labour share concentrate in a few highly productive firms	(3,14,15)
Theories of the firm	The firm boundary is a transaction and knowledge cost that artificial intelligence lowers	(21,24,25)
Task-based automation	Technology acts on tasks, so the founder can become the unit of production	(12,30)
One-person company hypothesis	The boundary collapses to a single augmented founder, unverified at scale	(1,2)

The concentration was reproduced across countries and settings, with the impact of superstar firms on the labour share confirmed in Belgium, with the concentration of international markets confirmed in United States import data, and with the Matthew effect, in which an already large firm captured the next round of gains and compounded the concentration.(4,5,15)

The concentration reached beyond the labour share into the goods market, where the rising concentration of household shopping in superstar retailers raised retail markups, and into the geography of the economy, where territorial market power became a source of inequality in the automation era.[16,17] The hypothesis itself was tested directly and the superstar-firm explanation survived the test, and a heterogeneous-agent macro model reproduced the same pattern of rising markups and falling labour shares from the micro behaviour of leading firms.[18,19]

Artificial intelligence entered this axis as a new driver, because the concentration of vendors and customers around leading firms rose with their use of artificial-intelligence labour, and because the determinants of superstar-firm concentration were associated with the level of artificial-intelligence development in the economy, although the empirical isolation of artificial intelligence from the other drivers of concentration remained recent and incomplete.[7,20] The axis therefore established a firm that concentrates, and the next axis asks why such a firm exists at all.

The mechanism that links automation to concentration is a widening of productivity dispersion rather than a uniform rise in productivity. A leading firm that adopts the technology gains more than a laggard, and the gain is passed through to a larger market share and a lower labour share, so the concentration is a property of the spread between firms and not of the average firm.[3,14] The heterogeneous-agent evidence reproduces exactly this spread, with the markups and the labour share responding to the behaviour of the few firms at the top of the distribution rather than to the many at the middle.(19)

The territorial evidence adds that the spread is also spatial, because the regions that host the leading firms capture the gains of automation while the regions that host the laggards lose them, and the superstar-firm phenomenon is therefore a geography as much as a market structure.(17)

The retail evidence completes the picture, because the concentration of household shopping in a small number of retailers raised markups for consumers, which is the downstream face of the same reallocation.(16) The axis therefore describes not a concentration alone but a mechanism, and the mechanism is the first building block of the one-person company, because a technology that widens the spread between firms is also a technology that can widen the spread between a firm and a person.

The theory-of-the-firm axis explains the boundary that the hypothesis would dissolve. The firm boundary is drawn where the cost of an internal transaction falls below the cost of a market transaction, and the recent literature restates that boundary for the age of artificial intelligence, with the digitalization of the firm lowering the coordination and monitoring costs that once held activities inside the hierarchy.[21,22]

The uncertainty that surrounds a transaction, inherited from the Knightian and Coasean account, still shapes the boundary, and the evolutionary extension shows that the boundary is redrawn as uncertainty falls, which is the direction in which artificial intelligence pushes it.(23) The generative model is described as enabling an unbounded cognitive fusion that dissolves the market-versus-hierarchy distinction itself, because a single founder can now command the coordination that a hierarchy used to provide.(24)

The legacy of transaction-cost economics is explicit in this line of work, and the frontier of institutional analysis now treats the digital firm as the case that the classic theory anticipated but could not specify.(25) The empirical base is thinner than the theory, and its direction is contested.

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The transfer of tacit know-how and the safeguards against opportunism still pull activities inside the firm, and the determinants of firm boundaries measured in transport markets show that the boundary responds to asset specificity and performance rather than to the mere availability of a cheaper tool.[26,27]

The reduction of transaction costs by digital infrastructure was nonetheless associated with greater regional entrepreneurial vitality, which is the boundary shift observed in the data rather than merely predicted, and the digital transformation of manufacturing was associated with a reconfiguration of the outsourcing boundary itself.[22,28] The axis therefore established that the boundary is a cost, and that the technology lowers some of the costs that hold it in place.

The knowledge-based dimension of the boundary is the deeper reason the technology matters, because the firm in the knowledge-based view exists to integrate knowledge that the market cannot, and a tool that codifies knowledge weakens that reason. The digitalization account restates this point directly, with the theory of the firm now centred on the sustainable development of the digital firm rather than on the industrial firm, and the boundary is drawn where the technology, not the hierarchy, integrates the knowledge.(21) The generative model takes the point to its limit, because a model that encodes a corpus of codified knowledge lets a single user command the integration that once required a team, and the cognitive fusion that results is the dissolution of the knowledge function of the hierarchy rather than of its coordination function alone.(24)

The Williamsonian frontier reaches the same conclusion from the opposite direction, because the institutional analysis that began with markets and hierarchies now confronts a technology that does not fit either category cleanly.(25) The empirical work cautions against overstatement, because the knowledge that is tacit and the safeguards that prevent opportunism do not disappear when a tool becomes available, and the boundary measured in transport markets responded to specificity and performance rather than to the cost of a digital tool.[26,27] The boundary shift is therefore real but partial, and the one-person company is its limiting case rather than its general case.

The task-based axis supplies the unit of production that the boundary encloses. Technology acts on a task rather than on a worker or a firm, and the effect of automation on employment, wages and the division of labour is determined by which tasks are displaced and which new tasks are reinstated.[12,29] The tasks that a founder performs to build and run a company, search, analysis, drafting, coding, pricing and correspondence, are precisely the cognitive tasks that machine learning now performs at falling cost, and the exposure of those tasks, rather than of whole occupations, is what the task framework predicts and what the later estimates measure.[30,31] The consequence for the firm is double, because the same technology that lets a large firm automate a task also lets a single founder perform that task without an employee, and the net effect on the size of the firm depends on which margin dominates, a question that the macroeconomics of automation poses but does not yet answer for the firm boundary.(32) The organizational capability to deploy the tool is itself a construct that the literature measures and calibrates, and its effect on performance is not automatic but conditional on how the capability is built, which is the firm-level version of the task-level claim.(33)

The innovation-management frame adds that the tool changes how innovation is organized rather than only how tasks are executed, and this is the bridge from the task to the firm.(34) The hybrid-problem-solving evidence adds that the tool does not automate the judgment task but augments the human who performs it, so the founder, and not the machine, remains the bearer of the residual decisions.(35)

The early adoption of a generative coding assistant is an empirical instance of that augmentation, with the tool raising the output of the individual developer rather than replacing the developer, and the rethinking of labour and value in the age of artificial intelligence extends the same logic from the marginal task to the lifecycle of the firm.[36,37] The axis therefore established the founder as a plausible unit of task execution, and the next axis joins the three preceding axes into the hypothesis.

The distinction between the judgment task and the routine task is the hinge on which the entire axis turns, because the tool displaces the routine and augments the judgment, and the founder is the residue of that division. The hybrid-problem-solving evidence formalizes the division, with the machine contributing the search and the human contributing the judgment, and the performance of the pair exceeding either alone.(35)

The coding-assistant evidence is the cleanest instance of the same division at the level of a single worker, because the tool raised the output of the developer without replacing the developer, and the task that remained with the developer was the judgment of what to build.

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(36) The wage-inequality evidence supplies the aggregate counterpart, because the same task displacement that raised the productivity of the augmented worker widened the gap between the workers whose judgment was augmented and the workers whose routine was automated.(31)

The capability evidence adds that the firm does not inherit this division automatically, because the capability to deploy the tool is itself measured and calibrated, and firms and founders differ in that capability in the same way they differ in judgment.(33) The innovation-management evidence completes the axis, because it shows that the tool changes the organization of innovation rather than only the execution of tasks, and the founder who organizes innovation alone is the one-person company in embryo.(34) The axis therefore established that the founder is the unit of judgment, and the next step is to ask whether the judgment of one founder is enough to carry a firm.

The one-person-company axis joins the three preceding axes into the hypothesis that the boundary collapses to the founder alone. A founder who can perform the firm's tasks with a tool, and who faces lower transaction costs for the inputs the tool cannot produce, no longer needs the boundary that the firm was built to draw, and the one-person company is the limit in which that boundary collapses to the founder.[1,2]

The reconfiguration is not hypothetical, because the density of the artificial-intelligence ecosystem was associated with the emergence of one-person companies across cities, and because the agentic systems that coordinate multiple models begin to substitute for the manager that the founder would otherwise hire.[1,38]

The capability is supported by the patent record of agentic systems, which documents a rapid accumulation of the coordinating technology, and by the general-purpose-technology evidence, which treats artificial intelligence as a technology that changes the structure of the economy rather than a single tool.[39,40] The boundary conditions are where the hypothesis weakens. The solopreneur differs from the conventional entrepreneur in the journey to success, and the difference is not uniformly favourable, because the financially vulnerable solopreneur bears a health toll that the supported founder does not, and the novelty that the tool generates does not translate automatically into the quality of the firm.(41-43)

The regulation of artificial-intelligence entrepreneurship further conditions the emergence, because the financial rules that govern the founder shape the rate at which the one-person company appears.(44) The hypothesis is not supported by any verified one-person unicorn, and the review treats that absence as a boundary condition rather than as a refutation, because the supporting evidence is a demonstration of capability and not a demonstration of sustained scale (Table 2; Figure 1).

Table 2. Boundary conditions of the one-person company hypothesis.

Condition	Evidence status	Supporting studies
Founder skill and calibrated judgment	Established for augmentation, untested for scale	(35,41)
Platform and ecosystem dependence	Emerging from socio-technical evidence	(1)
Sustained scale and survival	Unverified, no documented one-person unicorn	(2,42)
Financial and health vulnerability	Documented for solopreneurs	(42)

Note: Evidence status distinguishes an established finding from a claim supported only by demonstration.


Each boundary condition deserves to be stated separately, because each gates the hypothesis at a different point. The skill condition gates it at the input, because the tool augments the capable founder and does not substitute for the incapable one, and the contrast between the solopreneur and the conventional entrepreneur shows that the journey to success differs in exactly the capabilities that the tool cannot supply.[35,41] The platform condition gates it at the infrastructure, because the one-person company is a socio-technical system that depends on the surrounding ecosystem of artificial intelligence, and a founder without that ecosystem does not reach the one-person form.(1)

The survival condition gates it at the output, because the health toll and the financial vulnerability of the solopreneur are the costs that appear after the founding moment, and no documented one-person company has yet reached the scale that the unicorn label implies.[2,42] The novelty condition gates it at the product, because a tool that raises the rate of novelty without raising its quality produces many firms and few distinctive ones, and the one-person company that matters is the distinctive one rather than the merely numerous one.(43) The regulatory condition gates it at the environment, because the financial rules that govern the founder shape

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the rate of emergence, and the technology alone does not decide the outcome.(44)

Figure 1. Conceptual framework of the transition from superstar firm to super-individual.



The hypothesis is therefore delimited by these conditions rather than refuted by them, and the delimitation is the review's answer to the question of whether the one-person company is a real limit or a speculation.

Read together, the four axes describe a single mechanism with two possible directions, and the review's synthesis is the statement of that mechanism. The mechanism is that the cost of the firm boundary is a function of the cost of the tasks the firm must perform, and a technology that lowers the cost of the tasks lowers the cost of the boundary, so the boundary shrinks unless the same technology lowers the cost of scale by more. The superstar-firm axis shows that the technology has so far lowered the cost of scale by more, because the leading firms grew faster than the laggards and the concentration rose.[3,6]

The theory-of-the-firm axis shows that the technology lowers the cost of the boundary itself, because coordination, contracting and knowledge integration all become cheaper.[21,24] The task-based axis shows that the technology lowers the cost of the routine task while leaving the judgment task with the human, so the founder is the unit to which the boundary would shrink.[12,35] The one-person-company axis shows that the shrink has begun but has not been completed, because the boundary conditions of skill, platform, survival, novelty and regulation all bind before the unicorn is reached.[1,42]

The synthesis is therefore not a prediction but a condition, and the condition is that the one-person company is the limit the technology approaches and the superstar firm is the limit the technology has so far realized.

The conditions under which the transition does not occur are the mirror of the boundary conditions, and they are as explicit as the conditions of success. The transition fails when the cost of scale falls faster than the cost of the boundary, which is the world the superstar-firm evidence currently describes, because the leading firm that automates its routine tasks grows faster than the founder who automates the same tasks alone.[3,6] The transition fails when the judgment task cannot be concentrated in one person, which is the case whenever the venture depends on tacit knowledge that a tool cannot codify or on safeguards against opportunism that a single founder cannot provide.(26)

The transition fails when the founder bears a cost that the firm would have absorbed, the health toll, the liability and the financial risk that the solopreneur evidence documents.(42) The transition fails when the product of the augmented founder is rapid but not distinctive, because a founder who produces what every other augmented founder produces does not build a firm worth one person, let alone a unicorn.(43)

The conditions of failure are therefore as informative as the conditions of success, and together they state the review's central claim, that the one-person company is the limit the technology approaches and the founder has not yet reached. The final condition is temporal, because the tool improves faster than the founder can adapt, and the one-person company that exists this year may be obsolete next year, so the transition is a moving limit rather than a fixed one.

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DISCUSSION

The main finding of this review is that the one-person company is a coherent extension of three established bodies of theory, and that its coherence is theoretical rather than empirical, because no verified one-person company at unicorn scale has been documented. The superstar-firm literature explains the concentration that the hypothesis would reverse, the theory of the firm explains the boundary that the hypothesis would dissolve, and the task-based literature explains the founder as the unit of production that the hypothesis assumes, so the hypothesis is not an invention but a limit case of mechanisms that are each independently established.(3,9,12)

The contribution of the review is the assembly of the three, because each literature states its own mechanism without stating the limit at which the three converge, and the convergence is exactly the one-person company. The three literatures, each developed for its own question, converge on a single boundary condition, the cost of the task, and the review's theoretical contribution is to name that convergence rather than to add a fourth mechanism to the three.

The finding is concordant with the studies that report the lowering of firm costs and the augmentation of the founder. The transaction-cost and firm-boundary literature reports that digital and generative tools reduce the coordination and contracting costs that once held activities inside the firm, and this is the same mechanism that the review places at the centre of the transition.[25,28] The classic account of firm boundaries already treated the distribution of internal politics and of knowledge as determinants of where the boundary is drawn, and the digital evidence shows that the same determinants now shift the boundary inward, so the concordance extends to the older theory rather than contradicting it.[45,46]

The task-based and augmentation evidence reports that the tool raises the output of the individual rather than the headcount of the firm, and the early evidence on the adoption of a coding assistant reproduces that augmentation at the individual developer level.[30,36] The socio-technical evidence reports the emergence of one-person companies in ecosystems with a high density of artificial intelligence, which is the transition observed in the data rather than merely predicted by the theory.(1)

The concordance is strongest at the margin of cost and capability, and it is weaker at the margin of scale, which is the margin that the discrepant studies occupy. The organizational-capability and innovation-management evidence extends the concordance to the firm level, because the capability to deploy the tool and the reorganization of innovation that it enables are the channels through which the cost reduction reaches the founder.[33,34]

The discrepant studies challenge the transition on the margin where it is least tested, and the explanation is that the challenge concerns scale rather than capability. The firm-growth evidence reports that artificial intelligence enlarges the firms that adopt it, which runs opposite to the one-person prediction, and the divergence is explained by the outcome measured, because a tool that raises the productivity of a single founder also raises the productivity of a firm that employs a thousand, and the technology does not by itself decide which of the two captures the gain.(6)

The solopreneur evidence reports that the one-person firm is financially vulnerable and that its founder bears a health toll, which challenges the super-individual as a stable rather than a precarious form of production.[41,42] The innovation evidence reports that the tool raises the rate of novelty without raising its quality, which challenges the super-individual as a source of distinctive rather than merely rapid output.(43) The geographic and regulatory evidence adds a further condition, because the emergence of the one-person company depends on the density of the surrounding ecosystem and on the financial rules that govern the founder, so the transition is not a property of the technology alone but of the context in which it is deployed.[1,44]

Each discrepancy is a boundary condition in the terms of this review, and the boundary conditions together mark the transition as plausible at the cost margin and unproven at the scale margin. The concentration studies that report rising markups and falling labour shares are therefore not evidence against the one-person company but evidence about the margin at which the technology has operated so far, and the review's reading of the discrepancy is that the margin has not yet reached the founder, which is why the one-person company remains a hypothesis rather than a description.[3,6]

The review has limitations that bound the confidence of its conclusion, and each limitation carries the recommendation that would overcome it. The synthesis is narrative rather than systematic, so relevant work may have been missed, and the recommendation is a systematic search with a registered protocol once the construct is indexed consistently. The core evidence is concentrated in the years 2024 to 2026, so the longer-run outcomes of survival, scale and liability are unmeasured, and the recommendation is a longitudinal design that follows one-person

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companies beyond the founding moment.

The theoretical integration rests on analogies between three literatures that use different units, the firm, the task and the founder, and the recommendation is a formal model that states the boundary of the firm as a function of the cost of each task, a language that the task-based literature already supplies.(29)

The absence of a verified one-person unicorn is treated here as a boundary condition, but it could equally be evidence against the hypothesis, and the recommendation is to specify in advance the outcome that would count as a refutation rather than as a boundary. A further limitation is the construct itself, because the one-person company, the solopreneur and the super-individual are not indexed consistently across databases, and the recommendation is a shared definition and a set of search terms that the field can adopt so that the next review can be systematic.

The scope of the review is bounded in two further ways, because the searches were restricted to English and to two databases, and a wider review across languages and platforms could surface evidence that this one missed, so the conclusion is offered as the best current assembly rather than as the final word.

The implication of the review is that the one-person company should be read as the limit case of a real trend, and that its practical consequence lies in the governance of the firm rather than in its celebration or its dismissal. The technology lowers the costs that once required a firm, and the founder who uses it well can build more with less, but the same founder remains the bearer of the judgment, the liability and the risk that the tool does not absorb, and the super-individual is therefore a founder who is more exposed, not less, to the boundary conditions that this review names.

The transition from the superstar firm to the super-individual is a genuine theoretical possibility and not yet an observed fact, and the difference between the two is the difference between a hypothesis worth testing and a conclusion already drawn. The theoretical implication is equally concrete, because the three literatures that this review joins can now be taught and tested as a single model in which the boundary of the firm is the endogenous outcome of the cost of each task, and the practical implication is that a founder, a funder or a regulator who evaluates the one-person company should ask not whether the tool can build the firm but whether the founder can carry the firm, the judgment, the liability and the scale that the tool does not carry.

The research agenda that follows is therefore specific, to measure the survival and the scale of one-person companies against the same outcomes used for conventional ventures, and to test whether the founder who carries the firm alone carries it as far as the firm that shares the load.

CONCLUSIONS

The one-person company is theoretically coherent, because it is the limit at which the concentration of the superstar firm, the cost of the firm boundary and the task of the founder converge. The transition to the super-individual is bounded by founder skill, platform dependence and the unverified survival of the one-person firm at scale. The super-individual is therefore a plausible limiting case of the technology and not an established fact, and future work should test it against survival, scale and liability outcomes.

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